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ARTICLES
AGAINST SOVEREIGNTY: A CAUTIONARY NOTE
ON THE NORMATIVE POWER OF THE ACTUAL
Patrick McKinley Brennan*
When all is said and done.., it is the will symbolism in one or other
of its orthodox sovereignty versions which still requires our most
vigilant housekeeping attention. This is the reason for concentrat-
ing on the concrete organ and the abstract state as candidates for
that mythical political god-head in which power becomes de jure
without benefit of law.
-Kenneth Cole'
The lack of God in the modern age was compensated for by abstract
notions like sovereignty that were expected to sustain autonomous
human activities.
-Hideaki Shinoda
2
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This Article grew out of the Brendan F. Brown Lecture that I was honored to
deliver at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. For
honoring me with the invitation to deliver the lecture and for his abounding
hospitality during my visits to the Columbus School of Law, I am most grateful to
Dean William Fox. My thanks run also to Steve Smith, Rick Garnett, James Weinstein,
and Jack Coons for their incisive comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I
gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Roman Galas, Edward Heffernan,
Erin Galbally, John Wagner, and Christine Green, The phrase "the normative power
of the actual" has been employed by many; I first heard it from Paul Mishkin.
1 Kenneth C. Cole, The Theory of the State as a Sovereign Juristic Person, 42 Am. POL.
Sc, REv. 16, 31 (1948).
2 HIDEAKI SHINODA, RE-ExAMINING SOVEREIGNTY 11 (2000).
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I. AN ONTOLOGICALIY BAROQUE BACKYARD
At a given historical moment, the future is open in particular
ways-some wide, others narrower. Once a course of action is taken,
previously available options are foreclosed and certain other paths be-
come privileged. Michael Mann has referred to these as "caging" mo-
ments,3 and, as Christopher Pierson observes: "The large-scale history
of states is largely the story of this recurrent process of choices made
and options delimited-a process of caging that finds us bound by the
parameters of the modern state." 4 Pierson is doubtless right. For
good or ill, the modern state is pretty much what it is for the foresee-
able future. Still, every particular state remains a work in progress,
and our own, the United States, is no exception, and today we face an
important caging moment.
It concerns the "sovereignty" of our fifty states individually and of
the United States as a whole; more specifically, it concerns whether
these sovereignties should continue to increase, as they did by a series
of 5-4 decisions of the Rehnquist Court, whether they should be
cabined, or whether they should be scrapped. Starting in the 1996
decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida and continuing until its end, the
Rehnquist Court aggressively expanded the strand of Supreme Court
jurisprudence that predicated sovereignty of each of the fifty states
and of the United States as a whole. It is a widely discussed achieve-
ment of the Rehnquist Court that it did what it could to increase the
sovereignty of the states.6
This way of talking seems to assume that sovereignty is an empiri-
cal reality, with the organic capacity for increase and decrease, and
perhaps a need for help or hindrance. 7 But what, one might reasona-
bly ask, could it possibly mean for sovereignty-as opposed to, say,
brute power or even authority-to be a fact about the world? And a
fact to be encouraged, or discouraged? The Supreme Court reports
that the states "enjoyed" sovereignty before the ratification of the Con-
3 1 MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER 39-40, 47-49, 67-69, 105-27
(1986).
4 CHRISTOPHER PIERSON, THE MODERN STATE 63 (1996).
5 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
6 WILLIAM P. MARSHALL, The Battle Over State Immunity, in THE RENQUIST LEGACY
240 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006).
7 "Particularly in the Court's Eleventh Amendment immunity-from-suit cases,
one frequently encounters the image of the States as metaphysical, almost mystical,
entities, as demiurges in a kind of constitutional creation 'myth.' The States are, a
narrow majority ofJustices continues to insist, the kinds of things that simply cannot be
treated, or acted upon, in certain ways." Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The
Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 16 (2003).
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stitution, and "retain" it "today... except as altered by the plan of the
Convention or certain constitutional Amendments."" We shall have to
ascertain what "sovereignty" means before we can judge the truth of
the Court's claims, but there is at least facial plausibility to what a
distinguished student of sovereignty says:
Men do not wield or submit to sovereignty. They wield or sub-
mit to authority or power. Authority and power are facts as old and
ubiquitous as society itself.... Although we talk of [sovereignty]
loosely as something concrete which may be lost or acquired,
eroded or increased, sovereignty is not a fact. 9
If it is the Court's claim that sovereignty is not only a fact of our
political-legal world, but a fact to be encouraged, this claim will re-
quire substantiation: it is by no means self-evident that governments
we create can enjoy the predicate "sovereign." Even assuming such a
possibility, does it make even a modicum of sense to suppose that what
can be hemmed in by "Amendments" is actually "sovereign?" Can the
claim of sovereignty be sustained?' 0
Sovereignty's future, so to speak, rests, in the main, with the two
men who recently succeeded two pro-sovereignty members of the
Rehnquist Court. We have reason to suspect where Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Alito have their investments in terms of sovereignty;
however, the next caging moment has not quite arrived. For the mo-
ment, at least, the future remains open, as neither Chief Justice Rob-
erts nor Justice Alito has spoken to the issue in the United States
Reports. I 1
What has been said in recent years in the U.S. Reports regarding
sovereignty has concerned the conditions under which states are im-
8 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
9 F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY I (2d ed., 1986).
10 See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1603-04
(2002) ("Does the absence of a coherent rationale doom the new state-sovereignty
decisions to a short, ignominious life, or are these inconsistent decisions simply prep-
aration for a truly radical return to real state sovereignty, in which fifty different paro-
chial sovereigns can control their own destinies in certain areas free of any
coordination or control by the national government? This question cannot be an-
swered until the Court's majority decides for itself which path it wants to take."). A
new majority is now poised to "decide[ ] for itself." Id. at 1604. For my reasons for
denying that even local control of the sort adumbrated by Gey would not yield "fifty
different parochial sovereigns," see infra text accompanying notes 144-66 and
177-227.
11. Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Thomas's dissent from a holding that, act-
ing under the Bankruptcy Clause of Art. I, Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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mune to unconsented suit in various fora, viz., federal court, state
court, administrative agencies, or bankruptcy court. Once upon a
time, the Court's analyses of "sovereign immunity," both pro and con,
advanced for the most part in the quotidian terms ofjurisdiction, Arti-
cle III of the U.S. Constitution, and the Eleventh Amendment. How-
ever, in the course of three leading and multiple complementary
opinions, the Rehnquist Court made clear, albeit not uncontroversial,
that immunity to unconsented suit is merely one aspect of a quasi-
primordial reality called sovereignty, possessed in delegated form by
the national government and residually by the fifty states.12 In the
words of Justice Kennedy in Alden v. Maine.13
The federal system established by our Constitution preserves
the sovereign status of the States in two ways. First, it reserves to
them a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, to-
gether with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that
status....
Second, even as to matters within the competence of the Na-
tional Government, the constitutional design secures the founding
generation's rejection of "the concept of a central government that
would act upon and through the States" in favor of "a system in
which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concur-
rent authority over the people-who were, in Hamilton's words,
'the only proper objects of government."' . . .
The States thus retain "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty."
They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political
corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority,
of sovereigntyi 4
It will be necessary to inquire into the relationship among these
three abstract nouns (sovereignty, dignity, and authority), but first,
this question: Assuming arguendo that sovereignty can be a fact in the
world, are we not taken aback by assertions that it is possessed by the
states in which we men and women live? After all, claims lodged in
the name of sovereignty tend, of their nature, to devolve to the level
of strategic force. 15 Sovereigns have subjects, and subjects are, well, in
a state of subjection. Are we Americans our states' subjects? Further-
more, history attests that the nation-states which during the first half
12 Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760-61 (2002); Al-
den, 527 U.S. at 714-15 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996);
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 780-81 (1991).
13 527 U.S. 706.
14 Id. at 714-15 (citations omitted).
15 At least, that is, if we leave God out of the picture, though it must also be said
that humans have done the most barbaric things on the coattails of the sovereign
God.
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of the twentieth century propounded their own sovereignty did so to
ensure force's ascendancy over intelligence about justice.
Of the work "sovereignty" tends to do, the totalitarianisms of re-
cent memory are just vivid examples, not exceptions. There is always
a temptation, in statecraft and in law especially, to substitute force for
intelligence, raw power for authentic authority, and what more useful
force or power to wield than one for which sovereignty is effectively
claimed? "Sovereignty is a club of victors." 16 The Framers of the
United States Constitution knew the history of sovereignty, as a lived
reality, as well as a piece of philosophical creation, as by Jean Bodin
and Thomas Hobbes. 17 To these they preferred John Locke and
Baron de Montesquieu, as every American learns in high school civ-
ics. "'8 The Articles of Confederation explicitly predicated "sover-
eignty" of the colonies. 19 The Constitution does not use the word or
its cognates.
The Supreme Court, however, asks us to accede to the claim that
sovereignty can be found in the United States. According to Justice
Thomas for the Court in 2003: "The preeminent purpose of state sov-
ereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with
their status as sovereign entities."20 Allowing Congress to subject
states to private suits would be, Justice Thomas continues, "neither
becoming nor convenient," for it would denigrate the sovereignty of
16 Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259, 263 (2004).
Although my proximate focus here is domestic sovereignty as it is being claimed
within and on behalf of the United States, the emergence of positive sovereignty, such
as the Court claims on behalf of the fifty states and of the United States collectively, is
of course conceptually and historically related to the worldwide emergence of a posi-
tive right of free determination on the part of "the nation state." See PIERSON, supra
note 4, at 5-63. On how the world came to be organized into "sovereign states," see
generally DANIEL PHILPOTr, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY 75-96 (2001).
17 For discussion of Bodin and Hobbes, see infra text accompanying notes
149-57.
18 Cf. DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SoV EiIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAw 210
(2005) (arguing that the Constitution embodies a Lockean commitment to a theory
of sovereignty that cannot tolerate sovereign immunity, because government must be
answerable to its own laws). Doernberg's mistake, in my estimation, is to exaggerate
the Founders' commitment to the universal availability of individually adequate
remediation of legal wrongs. See infra text accompanying note 115. What the Foun-
ders did repudiate was the proposition that our states are "sovereign" in the sense in
which that term has generally been understood since the early seventeenth century.
See infra text accompanying notes 163-68.
19 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II.
20 Fed. Mar. Comm'n. v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
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the states.2 ' This ontologically baroque rhetoric is offered to describe
our own backyards.
Should we--can we--assent to such credulity-straining claims? I
said above that the future of a jurisprudence of sovereignty rests "in
the main" in the hands of two new members of the Supreme Court.
As Alexander Bickel said, the Court labors under the burden to suc-
ceed. 22 At the limit, it is in the nature of a Hobbesian sovereign to be
able to force and compel its subjects to assent. The question for us is
whether we should freely assent to claims made by a majority of the
Court on behalf of sovereignty as a fact of our political and legal real-
ity. My answer is in the negative, but in order to explain why we
should resist these claims, and, correlatively, why the Court should
stop making them, we shall have to determine the meaning (or mean-
ings) of "sovereignty;" we shall also have to say something about what
in who we are calls for resistance to claims of state sovereignty. The
Supreme Court that claims sovereignty on behalf of states also claims
it on our own behalf. "[S]overeignty is vested in the people."2 3 Is it a
fact about ourselves that "we" are sovereign?
I. TURNING TO TEXT: SOVEREIGNTY AND SUBJECTS
Rather than start with these questions about ourselves and our
political philosophy, we should turn to a text to help us get started-
lawyers are always turning to texts. 24
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been
used with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps,
have comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and estab-
lished that Constitution. They might have announced themselves
"SOVEREIGN" people of the United Staes [sic]: But serenely conscious
of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.25
Thus one text, from the Supreme Court in 1793; it speaks from the
seriatim opinion of Justice Wilson in the case Chisholm v. GeorgiaY6
The decision sustained a South Carolina citizen's assumpsit claim in
21 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
748 (1999)). For insightful commentary on this rhetoric, see Ann Althouse, On Dig-
nity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 245 (2000).
22 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
176-81 (1970).
23 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 794 (1995).
24 SeeJoseph Vining, Is There an Implicit Theology in the Practice of Ordinary Law?, 53
MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2002).
25 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (Wilson, J.).
26 Id. at 453.
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federal court against the state of Georgia, rejecting, over the lone 
dis-
sent of Justice Iredell, Georgia's claim that an unconsenting 
state was,
by virtue of its sovereignty, immune from suit by 
a citizen of another
state.27 Article III of the Constitution seemed clearly 
to countenance
such a suit by extending "the judicial Power"
28 of the United States,
and specifically the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
to con-
troversies "between a State and Citizens of another 
State," 29 nothing
else in the text of the Constitution contradicting 
or (relevantly) quali-
fying this power, which power was given statutory 
effect (if the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was not already self-executing) 
in
the Judiciary Act of 1789.30 Not even justice Iredell's dissent, 
which
preferred to rest on an interpretation of the 1789 
Act, found the state
of Georgia immune to unconsented suit 
because it was "sovereign."
31
The "shock of surprise"
32 allegedly caused by Chisholm prompted
speedy introduction of bills from which would 
emerge the text that
before long became the Eleventh Amendment 
to the Constitution.
The Amendment, drawn in terms of how the 
"the Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed," of course 
lacks any mention
of sovereignty.33 Nor does any subsequent Amendment 
breathe a
word of sovereignty. The fundamental written 
law of the United
States remains innocent, on its face, of pretensions 
to sovereignty.
Nevertheless, sovereignty was just beginning its American legal 
ca-
reer. If Justice Wilson, vaulting forward two centuries, 
could review
the future decisions of the Court on which 
he sat, he would have
heard, in 1991, then again in 1996, and yet again 
in 1999, that, "the
States entered the federal system with 
their sovereignty intact."
' 34 If
Justice Wilson were to inquire how such a thing 
happened without
benefit of the text of the Constitution, of which 
he was a signatory, he
would first learn, from Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
majority opinion in
the 1996 case Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
3 5 that this was accomplished
27 Id. (Blair, J.); id. at 466 (Wilson, J); id. at 469 (Cushins, 
J.); id. at 479 (Jay,
CJ.).
28 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
29 Id.
30 Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHi. L. REv. 61, 116 (1989) (discussing controversy over whether 
the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court is self-executing).
31 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) at 432 (Iredell, J.).
32 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
33 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
34 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 
775, 779 (1991), quoted in Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) and Seminole Tribe 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150
(1996).
35 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
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through the Court's recognition of a "background principle ... em-
bodied in the Eleventh Amendment."' 6 Only three years later, how-
ever, the Court would revise that understanding of the un-amended
document itself. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden v.
Maine 3 7 explained that, not the Eleventh Amendment, but "the found-
ing document 'specifically recognizes the States as sovereign enti-
ties,'-3" and that "[a]ny doubt regarding the constitutional role of the
States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment,
which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to
allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power." 9
But shortly the bewildered Justice Wilson would learn from Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports State Authority4 that "[t]he
principle of state sovereign immunity enshrined in our constitutional
framework ... is not rooted in the Tenth Amendment."4 1
This last assertion concerning the locus of the principle of state
sovereign immunity seems to have been the considered judgment of
exactly five members of the Rehnquist Court: ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
and justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor.42 Daniel Melt-
zer described them as "Five Authors in Search of a Theory."43
What theory or theories will Chief Justice Roberts and Justice A.-
ito advance, or concur in? The Rehnquist Court's sovereignty juris-
prudence is not inevitable. Perhaps the reconfigured Court will resist
the normative power of the jurisprudence the late Court made actual.
The Court sent an ambiguous but important transitional signal in
Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,4 4 where it held that the
"States agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert any sover-
eign immunity defense they might have had in proceedings brought
pursuant to 'Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.'" 45 Justice Stevens
wrote for a majority of five that included Justice O'Connor, the opin-
ion acknowledging that statements in Seminole Tribe assumed that the
Bankruptcy Clause of Article I did not give Congress the power to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.4 6 Katz has been read by
36 Id. at 72.
37 Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
38 Id. at 713 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.15).
39 Id. at 713-14.
40 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
41 Id. at 767 n.18.
42 Id. at 746.
43 Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011, 1011 (2000).
44 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).
45 Id. at 1004 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art 1, § 8, cl. 4).
46 Id. at 996.
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some as putting on the brakes with respect to the development of (the
jurisprudence of) sovereignty. 47 However, Justice O'Connor, a mem-
ber of the Katz majority, has been succeeded by Justice Alito. Moreo-
ver, Justice Thomas's dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, began with these un-
temporizing words: "Under our Constitution, the States are not sub-
ject to suit by private parties for monetary relief absent their consent
or a valid congressional abrogation, and it is 'settled doctrine' that
nothing in Article I of the Constitution establishes those
preconditions."4 8
More recently, the fully re-configured Court achieved unanimity
in holding that only states-not, for example, counties-are sovereign
(and therefore immune to unconsented suit), and this because they
were sovereign to begin with: "A consequence of this Court's recogni-
tion of preratification sovereignty as the source of immunity from suit
is that only States and arms of the State possess immunity from suits
authorized by federal law." 49
Except by joining the Northern Insurance Co. v. Chatham County
opinion,50 Samuel Alito has not spoken to the issue of sovereignty
since arriving on the Court. While on the Third Circuit, in Chittister v.
Department of Community & Economic Development,51 the much-discussed
case arising under the Family and Medical Leave Act, Judge Alito
wrote for the Third Circuit:
Under the Eleventh Amendment, a plaintiff other than the United
States or a state may not sue a state in federal court without the
latter state's consent unless Congress abrogates the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to a constitutional provision grant-
ing Congress that power. The Fourteenth Amendment confers
such power, but Article I of the Constitution does not.5 2
Though this might suggest to some that it is obvious that Justice
Alito would join the four Katz dissenters, thus restoring the remnant
quadrumvirate to majority status, it may or may not be significant that
still in 2000 Judge Alito was thinking in terms of "Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity,"55 which the Court had stopped doing in 1999 in Al-
47 See, e.g., Richard Lieb, State Sovereign Immunity: Bankruptcy is Special, 14 Am.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 200, 202-03 (2006).
48 Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005-06 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
49 N. Ins. Co. v. Chatham County, 126 S. Ct. 1689, 1693 (2006).
50 Id. at 1692.
51 226 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
52 Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
53 Id.
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den.5 4 One can also add that as a circuit judge he was bound 
by
Supreme Court precedent in a way that he no longer 
is. In any event,
an insistence upon a textual basis for sovereignty 
and sovereign immu-
nity would be the kiss of death for the "preratification 
sovereignty"
project hitherto pursued by the Rehnquist majority.
55
In service of that kiss, we can ask this question 
again: Are we from
the twenty-first century not surprised and shocked 
when, with increas-
ing frequency and progressively greater effect, 
the Supreme Court of
the United States claims "sovereignty" on behalf 
of fifty political units
and, differently, the nation that comprises them? 
Are we persuaded
when a five-member majority of the Court avers that while 
the "pri-
mary sovereignty"56 remains in the nation and national 
government,
the states "retain 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,"'
5 7 
"together
with the dignity and essential attributes" of sovereignty?
58 We should
scrutinize these claims while we still can; beware 
the normative power
of the actual. Justice Wilson, I dare say, would 
be incredulous at the
future in which assertions of the state sovereignty 
are growing ever
larger and more prominent in our national 
political understanding.
And what of the conflation "sovereign 
dignity?'" 59
If we refuse to be dazzled by them, what sense 
can we make of the
Court's recent decisional essays characterizing 
the states in soaring
terms of sovereignty and deep dimensions of dignity? 
Judge John T.
Noonan, Jr., has observed unexceptionably that 
these "doctrines are
abstract."60 Is Noonan correct when he adds that 
this "[a] bstractness
gives them an appearance of depth they do not 
deserve?" 61 Steven
Smith has warned lawyers against the "nonsense" 
of words that we can-
not make sense of in terms of what we believe to 
be real 62-that is, in
terms of what registers in our "ontological 
inventory."65 Is the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence of "sovereign dignity" just so much 
ab-
stract judicial nonsense? One commentator, who has some cautiously
critical things to say about the Court's sovereignty 
jurisprudence in
54 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999).
55 Chatham County, 126 S. Ct. at 1693.
56 Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.
57 Id. at 715 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James 
Madison)).
58 Id. at 714.
59 Id. at 715.
60 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE 
NATION'S POWER 2 (2002).
61 Id.
62 Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural 
Law, in AGAINST THE LAW 100, 101-02
(Paul F. Campos et al. eds., 1996).
63 S-rEVN D. SMITH, LAw's QUANDARY 14-15 (2004).
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particular, is generally in favor of the Court's 'jurisprudence of 'big
ideas,"' of which sovereign dignity would be an example. 64
As would "federalism." Some students of the Court will say-
whether in praise or condemnation, it matters not for the present pur-
pose-that the sovereignty jurisprudence that has emerged over the
last decade is best understood as the Rehnquist Court's finding a way
to revivify "federalism' by, as it were, resuscitating National League of
Cities v. Usert through the back-door and there is, no doubt, some-
thing to this (and I shall come back to it). My current interest is with
what the Court is saying-not only about the sovereignty of states and
the nation, but also about "dignitary interests" the Court discerns in
these "sovereign entities." We hear today that the states "retain the
dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty."6 6 Judicial rhet-
oric promoting "sovereign" states and their "dignity" is becoming fa-
miliar, but does this familiarity render the claims any more
intellectually digestible? Or palatable? The deeds done in the name
of "sovereignty" have been bad company to keep, as history more than
amply attests.
Still, the meaning of earlier claims to sovereignty does not decide
the meaning of today's claims, even those made with the same words
and sounds. Words and clauses spoken today have a real meaning
that history does not determine. We should ask, therefore, what par-
ticipants in a liberal democracy mean when they claim sovereignty,
including from the highest bench of the least dangerous branch?67
Consider, to begin, that the Court's claims on behalf of sover-
eignty occur within the cultural context of a post-modern state and
Supreme Court that are sometimes so unsure of their own dominion
as to have relocated sovereignty in the individual.68 It is the same Su-
preme Court that in one breath, per Justice Kennedy in a breathtak-
ing bit of anti-metaphysics, identifies the "heart of liberty [as] the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life,"'69 that, in a next breath,
per the same Justice Kennedy, makes metaphysical claims that would
delight the medieval mind. Not only are the states sovereigns, accord-
ing to Justice Kennedy, they enjoy, as I have already noted, something
64 Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. &
MARY L. Rvv. 1601, 1604 (2000).
65 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
66 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
67 See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
68 RUSSELL HITINGER, THE FIRST GRACE 137 (2003).
69 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
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called "sovereign dignity.
70 What can it possibly mean for us to in-
habit this rhetorical dissonance, according to which 
individuals define
the meaning of their existence, but states of our 
creation come bear-
ing "essential attributes?"
The remarkable language used by the Court to 
justify its holding
unconsenting states immune to private suits 
has seemed to some
scholars worthy of prompt dismissal 
as mere rhetorical flourishes.
7 1
Though the appeal of this labor-saving strategy 
is obvious, it should be
resisted. Ifwe could conclude that words and concepts issuing 
persist-
ently from the Supreme Court of the United States 
of America could
be "mere," we would have a very different case. 
As things stand, how-
ever, who can doubt but that the Supreme Court 
is a primary deter-
miner of our national culture-of our matrix of reasons 
for doing,
forbearing, judging, congratulating, of the meaning of what 
we do in
the name of government and law? Lacking 
religion, ethnicity, and
(increasingly) native tongue in common, we absorb the unifying 
doc-
trines devised by the Supreme Court, and poofl.-E 
Pluribus Unum,
one issue at a time or several in one swallow. For 
instance, the Consti-
tution says nothing of a "wall of separation" between 
church and state,
but in the cafes and on the streetcars one cannot 
but overhear non-
lawyers inveighing and remonstrating about a 
wall, "free exercise" and
"establishment nowhere and by no one mumbled. Other examples
are everywhere to be found. The point is, the 
ubiquity of law and its
language sets part of the stakes for our inquiring 
whether the court is
ingenuous or disingenuous-and whether we are 
astute or obtuse-as
the Court entrenches and we internalize the idea 
that both states and
the national government are sovereign(s), and therefore 
enjoy sover-
eign dignity and dignitary interests, with the 
result that they are im-
mune to suit by persons whom they have harmed.
We face questions of justice; but, because what we say is constitu-
tive of who we are, because the reasons on which 
we choose to act also
contribute to who we are as human subjects, we also face questions 
of
the sort of people we are making ourselves to 
be, as a body politic and
as individuals, as we accede to claims of the "sovereign 
dignity" of the
states that are our creations and should be our 
servants. "[Mlan,"Jac-
ques Maritain famously said, "is by no means for 
the State. The State
is for man. ' 72 Surely, the Justices of the Supreme 
Court would not
70 Indeed, such a conflating claim would 
likely have bedeviled the medieval
mind, fascinated as it was with distinguishing, 
without separating, such realities and
concepts. See ERNST H. KANTOROWcZ, Tt-E 
KING'S Two BODIES 372-82 (1957).
71 Meltzer, supra 43, at 1040.
72 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 
13 (1951).
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disagree. Is it not, then, exactly because the Court's "sovereign dig-
nity" rhetoric is both unlikely and entirely actual, both outlandish and
potentially effective that we should take its measure with care? The
Court could be saying such strange things to no real purpose or effect,
but this seems entirely unlikely, and the stakes-the assignation of sov-
ereignty and its prerogatives-suggest that we should decide this one
for ourselves.
Returning now to the questions framed at the outset, I would re-
fine them as follows: Should we accede to the United States Supreme
Court's claims that the fifty states are, first, sovereigns, with, second
and consequently, dignitary interests, and, third, as a result, enjoy
(with exceptions to which we shall come) immunity to unconsented
private suits? I have telegraphed that I shall argue that sovereignty, as
a property of states, should be resisted-but I should emphasize that,
from the premises that support my resistance, nothing follows imme-
diately about the necessary and sufficient conditions of private suits
against states in federal court, state court, or any conceivable other
tribunal. Nor will this call for resistance entail a rejection of the Su-
preme Court's efforts and (constitutional) responsibilities to treat the
States as members of a federation, rather than as mere departments of
one unified nation; indeed, toward the end it will be necessary, in view
of what else I have to say here about the place of "text" in our constitu-
tional adjudication, to say something about what should guide the
Court's thinking with respect to the States.
The reasons for opposing and not acquiescing in the Court's revi-
sion of our political self-understanding, as concerns sovereignty and
its dignity, are multiple, but I wish to focus on some of them as they
come together as inconsistent with who we are. Erwin Chemerinksy has
written forcefully Against Sovereign Immunity, on the ground that the
doctrine favors government to the interests of the governed in being
made whole. 73 I write not so much against sovereign immunity, as
against sovereignty. The core of my opposition to the concept of sover-
eignty as a property of states we create is that it is false to who we are
and, in addition, to who we should wish to become.74 It is (only)
73 Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1213-15
(2001).
74 The exigence of starting law and politics from an accurate grasp of the human
person is a topic [ have been pursuing, from a range of angles and applications, in a
number of recent writings. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Asking the Right Questions:
Harnessing the Insights of Bernard Lonergan for the Rule of Law, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 1
(2006); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Law and Who We Are Becoming, 50 VILL. L. REv. 189
(2005); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Law, Natural Law, and Human Intelligence: Living
the Correlation, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 731 (2006); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Locating
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through an appreciation of who we are that we can proceed to law and
politics correlative to our human dignity.
In an imagined world in which "law" is not correlative to the na-
ture of those bound by that "law," the traction comes not from law
but, rather, from brute force and sheer power. In the real world, how-
ever, in which law does have (or should have) genuine traction, "the
question what the law 'is' is not so different from the question who
'we' are."75 What is law for us enjoys that status because it respects
who we are. Who are we? We are partly given and partly self-constitut-
ing, rational, purposive agents freely bound by the natural law. It is
our opportunity ;nd exigence to realize what is good for us, that makes
us, first, better than mere objects (to be controlled and ruled by a
separate and condescending sovereign) and, second, less than sover-
eign ourselves, either individually or collectively (and therefore im-
portunate of means of just self-government).
The reality of who we are counters claims to terrestrial sovereignty;
it also counters claims that would transfer dignity from ourselves to
our creations, such as the state. Dignity inheres in our capacity to
engage in intentional self-government that is good both for us and for
those who, equally with us, are human persons. If there be dignity in
states of our creation, it is because we put it there without alienating it
from ourselves. There will be more to say about this in due course:
the point to flag at the threshold, before we cross over to consider
claims on behalf of the sovereignty and sovereign dignity of the states
we create, is that it is who we are that both allows and limits what we
create. We 'are neither the creators of, nor the proper objects of, ter-
restrial sovereignty.
Authority in Law, (hereinafter Brennan, Locating Authority] in ArrER AUTHORIT (Pat-
rick McKinley Brennan ed., forthcoming 2007); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Meaning's
Edge, Love's Priority, 101 MIcH. L. REv. 2060 (2003) [hereinafter Brennan, Meaning's
Edge] (reviewingJAmEs BoYE WITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING (2001)); Patrick McKinley
Brennan, On What Sin (and Grace) Can Teach Crime, 5 PUNISHMENT & Soc'v 347 (2002)
(editing performed by Patrick Brennan and Jeffrie Murphy); Patrick McKinley Bren-
nan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV. 227 (2002); Patrick
McKinley Brennan, Sovereign States? The State of the Question from a Catholic Perspective, in
FAITH AND LAW: HOW RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW AMERICAN
LAW (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. ed., forthcoming 2007); Patrick McKinley Brennan, The
"Right" of Religious Liberty of the Child: Its Meaning, Measure, and Justification, 20 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 129 (2006); see alsoJoHN E. CooNs & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, By NATURE
EQUAL 136-41 (1999) (discussing the nature and meaning of human equality).
75 JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEXWTON'S SLEEP 128 (1995).
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III. To ESTABLISH SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty, as a term of political discourse, has a long history, to
some of which we must come. But because our question concerns
whether the Court should continue its recent claims in the name of
sovereignty, we must begin by ascertaining what those claims are. The
Rehnquist Court's doctrines on sovereignty and the consequent im-
munity are, as Charles Fried has remarked, "exceedingly compli-
cated."76 However, the bottom line, from which we can move
backwards, can be fairly easily summarized. A state cannot be sued,
absent its consent, in either a federal forum (including an administra-
tive agency) or its own courts by any party other than the federal gov-
ernment or a sister state; thanks to Alden (or Alden's sources),
Congress is powerless to abrogate a state's immunity to suit in its own
courts.7 7 First, an exception to what I just said in summary; second, a
note, in several parts, about the context that nourishes and qualifies
the claims of sovereignty that justify or allow this immunity to suit.
The exception: Although Alden rejects the conclusion of the 1989
case Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 78 which had held in a plurality
opinion supplemented by Justice White's fifth vote, that Congress,
under its Article I Commerce Clause power, could abrogate a state's
immunity in its own courts, 79 Alden let stand the rule of the 1976 case
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,8 0 in which the Court, per then-Justice Rehnquist,
held Congress possessed of the power to authorize private suits against
unconsenting states under its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment,"' the theory being, at least as explained by Justice Ken-
nedy in Alden, that in adopting that Amendment "the people required
the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been
preserved to them by the original Constitution."8 2 Alden did explicitly
observe the continuing vitality of the rule of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,8" but
one should also note that in a series of post-Alden cases (including City
of Boerne v. Hores,8 4 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank,8 5 United States v. Morrison,8 6 and Kimel v. Florida
76 CtARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAw Is 35 (2004).
77 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999).
78 Id. at 732.
79 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (plurality opinion).
80 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
81 Id. at 447-48.
82 Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
83 Id. (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456).
84 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
85 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
86 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Board of Regents87) the Court has narrowed, without questioning, Con-
gress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.8
When Congress acts under Section 5, and does so in the way the Court
has prescribed, the states are no longer sovereign and, therefore, not
immune. A sliding scale of sovereignty?
Before proceeding further to spell out some of the context, we
should pause to observe that, whether the congressional power found
by Bitzer can avoid slipping into incoherence in the "sovereign dig-
nity" climate created by Seminole, Alden, and their progeny, is a telling
question. It is hard to fathom how what the states ceded by ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment differs utterly from what they ceded in
joining the Union in the first place, as concerns the power of Con-
gress to subject the states to federal law. True, we have a clearer re-
cord of just how clear the states were as concerns what they were
giving up in 1868, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does
provide that "[t] he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article."8 9 But, even prescinding
from the evidence from the founding period that militates in favor of
a strong national government, there is the proximate fact that the
Court acknowledged-when in 1985 in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transportation Authority90 it overruled Usery9 1-that the states are
not immune from the national government's substantive regulation of
employee wages.92 If the states are wide open to regulation by a na-
tional government of such expansive (and more-than-enumerated)
powers, we might ask whether it makes "sense for states to be subject
to [such] federal regulation but to enjoy immunity with respect to
major techniques of enforcement of that regulation. ' 93 Does the met-
aphysics of state sovereignty generate, or can it bear the weight of, this
distinction?
Now, for some of the context out of which the Rehnquist meta-
physics of sovereignty grew. As it was sustained by the Court until the
early 1990s and has since been expanded and rationalized afresh, the
immunity of states to most unconsented suits presupposes a thick arse-
nal of jurisdiction and remedies to vindicate private interests and, cu-
87 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
88 That power was reaffirmed during the last term in an opinion by Justice Scalia
for a unanimous Court. United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 878 (2006).
89 U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 5.
90 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
91 Id. at 546-50.
92 Id. at 555-57.
93 RjcuARD H. FALLON JR., DANIEL J. METZLER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHISLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1061 (5th ed. 2003).
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mulatively, to keep states generally within the bounds of the law.
"Sovereign immunity," as the Court uses the term, means that states
cannot be sued in their own name without their consent-except, as
noted above, by the federal government, or a sister state, or thanks to
Congress's acting under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such "sovereign immunity" does not, however, preclude, first, suits for
injunctive relief against the appropriate state governmental officers
sued in their official capacity, under the doctrine of Ex parte Young,94
or for retrospective relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or through so-called
Bivens actions95 in appropriate cases.96 In addition to suits by individ-
uals of the several types just mentioned, the United States itself can
bring suit against states. 97 But although this federal power seems un-
questioned, and thus allows the Court a ground on which to affirm
thatjustice can be done, we might wonder about the willingness of the
national government to devote its own resources to suing states in or-
der to vindicate private individuals' interests at the expense of the
states.98 In Alden itself, for example, once the Supreme Court had
found the State of Maine immune to suit by probation officers seeking
back pay for violation of federal wages and hours laws, absent either a
waiver by the State of Maine or suit against state officers, only a suit by
the United States Department of Labor against the state of Maine,
could vindicate those individual probation officers' interests. 99 With-
out the Department's attention, energy, and resources being roused,
those interests would go un-vindicated (unless through the suits
against individuals already mentioned), and even a roused and inter-
ested Department of Labor may not be capable of getting the job
done. 100
This picture painted thus far could be misleading, moreover, be-
cause, although the Fair Labor Standards Act'01 provides for such
94 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
95 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
96 It should be noted in passing that both the scope of Ex palte Young and the
power of the Court to create Bivens-type actions have recently received skeptical treat-
ment from the Court. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 93, at 816-21, 1027-28.
97 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
98 See FRIED, supra note 76, at 37.
99 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999); FRIED, supra note 76, at 37.
100 Alden, 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("One hopes that... voluntary
compliance will prove more popular than it has in Maine, for there is no reason to
suspect today that enforcement by the Secretary of Labor alone would likely prove
adequate to assure compliance with this federal law in the multifarious circumstances
of some 4.7 million employees of the 50 States of the Union.").
101 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
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suits by the federal government, in many other areas 
of federal law
Congress has not provided jurisdiction that would 
allow such suits.10
2
In fairness, one must also mention that Congress 
might at some future
time authorize individuals to sue in the name of 
the United States to
seek compensation for a state's violation of federal 
law, but I think it
safe to speculate-in part because Justice Scalia 
has said in an opinion
joined by other members of the Court (in dictum in a case decided 
on
statutory grounds) that "there is 'a serious doubt"' that 
such an au-
thorization would survive a sovereign immunity 
inquiry' 03-that the
current Court is not about to allow such actions. 
Finally, of course, a
potential plaintiff can become an actual plaintiff 
thanks to a state's
waiving its immunity, something it will be under 
more or less practical
pressure to do (depending on what is at issue). In Alden, for example,
Maine both insisted upon its immunity and, continuing 
to flout its
obligations under federal law, did not 
pay damages to petitioners. 
10 4
There is much more that could be said about 
the tangled and
somewhat speculative web of jurisdiction and remedies that 
both al-
lows sovereign immunity and softens its bite, but 
what has been said is
enough, I trust, to signal the strangeness of the 
resulting situation. A
whole battery of highly-reticulated law has emerged 
to allow end-runs
around the erratic boulder of sovereign immunity, 
and this corpus
juris is thick with oddities and inconsistencies. 
Perhaps we can em-
pathize with Dean Prosser's resignation to 
law's not making more
sense than the rest of life,
105 but there are limits and with those limits
the ways around sovereign immunity play fast and loose. 
For example,
if states are truly sovereigns, it is hard to see why 
they should be vul-
nerable to unconsented suits by the United States. 
Further, if, as Jus-
tice Scalia has written, their sovereignty excludes 
them from the
coverage of Article IIi,10
6 under the basic rules of federal jurisdiction
their waiver should be powerless to get them 
into an Article III
court.1 0 7 The treatment of sovereignty 
as a "personal privilege,"
rather than as a rule ofjurisdiction, perhaps solves the problem 
at one
level, but creates a new one on another by 
asking us to regard our
102 See FRIED, supra note 76, at 32-45.
103 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States 
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787
(2000) (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 
288, 348 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring)).
104 527 U.S. at 813 n.43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105 William L. Prosser, Book Review, 27 CORNELL 
L.Q. 292, 294 (1942).
106 Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
669-70 (1999).
107 See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. 
Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 385-86
(1884).
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states as fictional persons.
1 8 And, if it's dignity that concerns us, is
there not a way in which a state would seem more 
attenuated or sul-
lied by an unconsented suit by a sovereigner sovereign 
(the national
government) than by a lone individual just trying to seek redress for 
a
wrong done him by his own government?
Credulity is further strained, as the first Justice 
Harlan observed
in his lone dissent in Ex parte Young, inasmuch 
as the officer suit there
blessed by the majority is transparently a device by which 
a federal
court can, through a fiction, tell the "sovereign" 
states how to be-
have. 109 The modern Court has called "the rule 
of Ex parte Young...
one of the cornerstones of [its] Eleventh Amendment 
jurispru-
dence"11 0 (that was in 1982; now it would be a cornerstone 
of the
Court's "sovereign dignity" jurisprudence); today's Court, 
in any
event, has been heard to call that cornerstone 
"an obvious fiction."'] 1
As Professor David Currie once observed, "[p]eople 
are not likely to
amend constitutions just to change captions on complaints." 
12 Yet, as
on that raucous British sitcom,
11 3 appearances are kept up. The states
are (residual) sovereigns, and justice, though subordinated 
and sub-
jected to the need for end-run tactics, does not go undone, at 
least not
too frequently.
We should be clear about what my objection is not. Sometimes
there is talk that "the rule of law" demands 
a one-to-one correspon-
dence between legal rights and legal remedies-" 
ubi ius, ibi remedium,"
as the Latin maxim has it. Such ideas received 
enduring encourage-
ment from Chief Justice Marshall in Marbuiy 
v. Madison,1 4 notwith-
standing that William Marbury went home 
commissionless. But,
though full of resonance, dicta of the sort Marshall 
offered are belied
by the overall body of our inherited jurisprudence of remedies. 
Our
rule of law, and the justice that it serves and that in turn clothes 
it with
legitimacy, has been satisfied by something less, 
something that allows
the system room to maneuver without room 
to evade the basic re-
quirements of lawfulness and justice. This is not my report 
of a Pla-
tonic Form; it is rather, my reading of an admittedly 
fallible, dynamic
tradition of reflection on justice and its implementation in 
the law we
108 See, e.g., Wis. Dep't. of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 
381, 393 (1998) (KennedyJ.,
concurring); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515-16 
n.19 (1982).
109 Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 168-204 
(1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
110 Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, 
Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982).
1I Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 
261, 270 (1997).
112 David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and 
Suits Against Government Officers, 1984
Sup. CT. REv. 149, 151 n.ll.
113 Keeping Up Appearances (BBC television series 1990-1995).
114 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
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inherit. That tradition, as Professors Fallon and Meltzer see it, "de-
mands a system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep govern-
ment generally within the bounds of law," and, while simultaneously
calling for individually effective redress for all violations of constitu-
tional rights, "tolerate [s] the denial of particular remedies, and some-
times of [any] individual redress" to the victim of a constitutional
violation. 115 For almost all constitutional wrongs, some remedy or
other will need to be available; but some questions, for example, "po-
litical questions," may lie beyond review and remediation. Presuma-
bly, the case is a forliori with respect to sub-constitutional rights and
remedies. In any event, Professors Choper and Yoo have recently
made out a strong case that lack of adequate individual remediation is
not, as an empirical matter, a strong objection to the Court's sover-
eign immunity jurisprudence. 16
Our inherited tradition, whatever its current convulsions, was fa-
miliar and largely comfortable with the idea that sometimes claims
that the state has violated individuals' legal rights may not be subject
to judicial review (and individual remediation). Perhaps we do not
cotton to the fact, but, as Judge Bork pointed out, "[T] he Supreme
Court has never suggested . . .that there might be a constitutional
difficulty in a statute that merely invoked sovereign immunity with re-
spect to suits challenging the constitutionality of a statutory denial of
government benefits."'" 7 Judge Noonan has been forceful in his con-
demnation of the Rehnquist Court's reducing-among other means,
through its recent expansion of state immunity by its denial of Con-
gress's power to abrogate that immunity under Article I powers-the
remedies available to individuals harmed by government wrongdo-
ing." Commentators critical of the Court's recent sovereign immu-
nity jurisprudence have criticized Noonan for exaggerating what
injustice occurs because of the Court's adjusting, as it has, the balance
between rights and remedies." 9 But this calculus is transcended, for
both Noonan and those who share few other of his premises, by the
harm that comes to human dignity when to it are preferred the digni-
115 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Con-
stitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1731, 1778-79 (1991).
116 Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The
Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 213, 213-17
(2006).
117 Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork,J., dissenting).
118 NOONAN, supra note 60, at 143-56.
119 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State Sover-
eign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1551 (2003)
(reviewing NOONAN, supra note 60).
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tary interests of, as the firstJustice Harlan put it, "the intangible thing,
called a State ....",,20 This is a cardinal point, which I shall pursue
below.
But before we can assess this state of affairs, before we can mea-
sure the meaning of the Court's invocations of sovereignty and dig-
nity, we should be clear about the reasons the Court advances or
implies for privileging state "dignity" over (potential) plaintiffs' inter-
ests, state sovereignty over individual plaintiffs' legal rights. We have
noted some of the working materials, and we can complete the sketch
in fairly short order.
Recall that, when, in Chisholm, the Court asked whether a citizen
of South Carolina could pursue his assumpsit claim against the state of
Georgia in federal court, the affirmative answer turned on Article III's
conferring jurisdiction for suits "between a State and Citizens of an-
other State."1 21 The Amendment to the Constitution prompted by
Chisholm provides in toto: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'122 The
words find or render Article III courts powerless over suits predicated
on jurisdiction of the sort found in Chisholm. However, for more than
a century now, this seemingly straightforward language has borne the
"interpretation" of the 1890 decision in Hans v. Louisiana,123 which all
the Justices currently serving on the Court, with the exception of Jus-
tice Stevens, regard as binding, either on the merits or on the ironi-
cally shifty ground of stare decisis.124
Hans looms large in the current Court's jurisprudence and even
its opinions.12-, The suit was an action in federal court by a Louisiana
citizen against his own state, for interest due on its bonds. 26 The
plaintiff Hans alleged that an amendment to the Louisiana Constitu-
tion barring the State from paying the interest owed due to the cou-
pons was an impairment of the obligation of contract in violation of
the United States Constitution. 27 The action was not brought by a
citizen foreign to Louisiana, and although what we now call a "federal
120 Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 175 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 430-33 (1793) (Iredell, j.).
122 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
123 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
124 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 84 (1996).
125 1 say "even," because whatever one thinks of the result in Hans, few are heard
to admire Justice Bradley's majority opinion in the case.
126 Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
127 Id. at 3.
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question" was implicated and properly pled, and thus 
would seem to
have provided a non-diversity ground ofjurisdiction, still the 
Supreme
Court denied jurisdiction on the ground that a contrary 
holding
would lead to the "anomalous result" that a state's 
own citizen could
do to it what the, citizen ofanother state or nation 
could not.128 The
text of the Eleventh Amendment, caricatured 
by Justice Bradley as
"the letter," the Court subordinated to pre-constitutional 
notions con-
cerning the suability of an unconsenting sovereign
-) 29 An amend-
ment, proposed by Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, 
that would
have accomplished this result had been defeated 
in Congress in favor
of the text that became the Eleventh 
Amendment.130
Riding on the subordinating wave of 
Hans came In re New York
13 1
in 1921 and Principality of Monaco v. Mississipp
i132 in 1934; in the for-
mer the Court "rejected a long standing interpretation of the 
amend-
ment that had treated admiralty cases as exempt 
from the Eleventh
Amendment bar because they were not 'in law 
or equity,' ,11 and, in
the latter, the "erosion of the amendment's 
explicit party alignment
limitation became complete"'
134 when the Court held that the jurisdic-
tional bar extended to suits against states 
by foreign governments
themselves, 35 notwithstanding that the Amendment 
mentioned only
suits by "citizens" against states.'
3 6 In Monaco, in language that was
destined to do much work in the Rehnquist 
Court's opinions, the
Court said that "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional 
provisions
are postulates which limit and control."'
' 37
Obviously enough, this language of geometry 
that brings Euclid
and Langdell tumbling to mind is easy to mock 
and dismiss, and is
especially so for those jurists and scholars who would like to 
limit law
to what has been posited in "legal texts." But, 
without becoming a
legal geometer, one can observe that those 
who would limit law to
what has been written down in the prescribed 
places labor against
many burdens, including the acknowledged 
legitimacy (and ines-
capability?) of "unwritten law" in our very own constitutional 
tradi-
128 Id. at 10.
129 Id. at 12.
130 John Paul Stevens, "Two Questions About Justice, "2003 
U. ILL. L. REv. 821, 824.
131 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
132 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
133 Massey, supra note 30, at 68.
134 Id.
135 Monaco, 292 U.S. at 331.
136 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
137 Id. at 322.
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tion. I - 8 This is not the place for an extensive consideration of the
nature and extent of law's unwritten sources, but it is necessary here
to say that, as we approach a body of law that makes claims on behalf
of unwritten law, I shall simply assume in what follows that the evi-
dence of what the law is, is not just what has been written down. To-
ward the end there will be something to say in defense of this
assumption, but here I would simply flag that, as I proceed, I am not
assuming that sovereignty's failure to appear in our written law is dis-
positive against its being part of our law. A "right to privacy" is not
written into our constitution, and look what a constitutional career it
is enjoying.
We shall return to these issues below. For now, we can say, in
summary, that the "conventional" view of the Eleventh Amendment,
given effect in the pre-1996 Rehnquist Court line of cases just summa-
rized, is that the "[Almendment made constitutional an original un-
derstanding that the states were immune from private suits in the
federal courts."13 9 A "revisionist" view still holds that the Amendment
had "no independent prohibitory force" and simply failed or refused
to authorize certain party based assertions of jurisdiction.1 40 Both
sides, conventional and revisionist, abound with difficulties. The tex-
tual problems that beset the conventional view are by now obvious
(and are, according to the otherwise-textualist majority of the Court,
irrelevant). The revisionists' view, for its part, rises or falls with one's
judgment of the history of the Amendment and what it called forth.
But even assuming that the history is relevant (a point on which I
should wish to insist), my own sense, admittedly tentative, is that, para-
doxically, the history is so rich as to be quite unhelpful. As John Orth
said some time ago, "the search for the original understanding on
state sovereign immunity bears this much resemblance to the quest
for the Holy Grail: there is enough to be found so that faithful of
whatever persuasion can find their heart's desire.' 4 1 For good or ill,
the jurisprudential and legal situation we face today buries the dialec-
tic between the conventional and revisionist views as it rises to a new
height. Again, according to the Court in the 2002 Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority case: "The preeminent
138 See generally CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM (rev. ed. 1947)
(tracing the history of constitutionalism in written and unwritten form); JAMES R.
STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY (1992) (discussing the development
and influence of unwritten common law on American constitutional tradition).
139 Massey, supra note 30, at 62.
140 Id.
141 JOHN V. ORTH, THEJUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (1987).
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purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity
that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.' 142
IV. SOVEREIGNTY ISOLATED
If immunity to unconsented private suit is preeminently in the
service of according units of our government what is theirs in virtue of
their being "sovereign entities," we shall need to know what it
means-in addition to being immune to some but not all uncon-
sented suits-to be a "sovereign," a sovereign "entity." We could look
only to the Court's contributions on this score, but doing so would
suppose the erroneous premise that legal language is a closed uni-
verse. The truth is, the Court's discourse is a fluid subset of our Amer-
ican culture, a loose dialect of our American English. Some of what
the Court says is heard only from courts, while most of what the Court
says amounts to an admixture of technical language and ordinary lan-
guage woven more or less seamlessly together to bring about and jus-
tify great effects-some of them coercive thanks to the sheriff, some of
them voluntary thanks to the Court's talking in ways that make pro-
gress in men's minds.
Sovereignty, thank God, is not a household word, but it has a
history that predates the United States and a usage that, even now, is
not primarily of the Court's creation. The Court has reappropriated
the word in the line of cases we have just been considering, but the
Court's doing so has not clipped the word's wings and thereby given it
for all users a universal definition of the Court's stipulation. Special-
ized discourse labors under the burden of what it would colonize. In
the larger linguistic and cultural context in which the Court and all of
us operate, sovereignty is as big as it gets, or at least almost. Analytic
philosophers working on the word "sovereignty" often give it a denota-
tion in terms of authority. For example, the classic essay by W.J. Rees,
The Theory of Sovereignty Restated,143 isolates six different meanings of
"sovereignty," in three of which "supreme authority" is at the core (in
the other three meanings identified by Rees, it's power rather than
authority). 144 But what are we to make of this translation? Can it
avoid being tendentious?
142 Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
143 W. J. Rees, The Theory of Sovereignty Restated, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SocI-
ETY 56, 56-61 (Peter Laslett ed., 1956).
144 Id.; cf W.J. STANmEwicz, ASPEcrs OF POLITICAL THEORY 47-95 (1976) (defend-
ing, against criticism sounding in terms of "hierarchy," a conception of sovereignty
rooted in authority).
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The issue presented is complex, because authority itself is a multi-
valent term. But a fair first response to trying to make sense of sover-
eignty as (supreme) authority is that, historically, in conventional and
much technical discourse the notion of sovereignty is designed and
deployed exactly to bypass considerations of authority. It is in the na-
ture of authority that it comes in different shapes and sizes. Resolu-
tion of authorities' competing claims calls for a prudent, perhaps even
Jesuitical, casuistry. Enlightenment philosophes disdained and sought
to discard authority exactly because where there is authority, there are
authorities; such multiple, competing claims or assertion of leaner
claims. Modernity was, in Jeffrey Stout's trenchant insight, in Flight
ftom Authority.145 Sovereignty, as modernity has sought to confect it,
would make a clean entrance as a scalar quantity, a rhetorical and
procedural trump card. Trading on its supreme and surpassing na-
ture, that for which sovereignty is claimed is licensed thereby to turn
away claims, even of justice.
But if the sovereignty of the fifty states works that way now in the
Supreme Court and, as a result, around the globe for a class of poten-
tial plaintiffs, it was not always so for sovereignty itself. Sovereignty
entered only in fits and starts, not at all sovereignly, not at all abso-
lutely. This should not surprise: the absolute is hard to come by, after
all. What the historians record is that on the Continent, throughout
the period from 1200 right up to about 1600, the ordinary situation
was, first, for people to be under the claims of multiple, overlapping
"sovereigns," and, second, for all such "sovereigns" to be understood
as subordinate to the higher norms of natural and divine law. 1 46 Most
of the discussion on the Continent took place in Latin, in which not
the English word "sovereignty" but the Latin words and phrases "potes-
tas absolutd' and "maiestas" and the like were the terms of art; and the
consistent, though not uniform, judgment was that these powers of
the prince were bounded by the obligation to honor the rights of sub-
jects and to serve the common good. There was, to quote Kenneth
Pennington, "[a] subtle dialectic between the rights of subjects and
the power of the prince." 4 7 Though the historical record cannot con-
145 JEFFREY STOUT, THlE FLIGHT FROM AuTHORIT 2-3 (1981).
146 See KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW 1200-1600, at 284-88
(1993); see also MANLO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST oF EUROPE 1000-1800, at
149-59 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1995) (discussing how European society operated
under both particularized law and ius commune); HAROLDJ. BERMAN, LAw AND REvoL.U-
TION 288-94 (1983) (noting that sovereignty was an outgrowth of the Roman concept
of iurisdictio and that numerous state and religious officials would have varying de-
grees of iuisdictio over a matter).
147 PENNINGTON, supra note 146, at 283.
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ceal that princes misbehaved, there was little question but that the
prince's legitimate power was limned by law not of human creation
(as well as by law of human creation).
"Subtle dialectic" was arrested thanks to the work of three giants
who signal the early modern period in politics; with them we witness a
preoccupation with power as such, 148 and, variously, flirtations with,
or even putative embrace of, sovereign power, that is, power under-
stood as absolute. Niccolo Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and Thomas Hob-
bes: their names are familiar, but even when their names do not come
to mind, their ideas remain in the air and they easily enter and, as I
say, make progress in men's minds. Machiavelli was the true innova-
tor, because his ideal prince lacked legitimacy (and the aspiration to
it) altogether. Machiavelli's novel claim was that the prince had no
relation to the law.149 Bodin makes for a slightly different case, be-
cause although he held that no prince has "absolute power," if by that
we mean that the prince is above divine, natural, and the common law
of all nations,' 50 Bodin's way of discussing the potestas absoluta of the
prince has led more of his readers than not to conclude that he both
recognized and commended such a power. Jacques Maritain, one of
our generation's most alert students of sovereignty and the implicated
vectors, stresses Bodin's recognition of the sovereign's subordination
to God, to divine and natural law, and to the ius gentium; he also fin-
gers what he regards as the innovative error in Bodin's thinking:
Since the people have absolutely deprived and divested themselves
of their total power in order to transfer it to the Sovereign, and
invest him with it, then the Sovereign is no longer a part of the
people and the body politic: he is "divided from the people," he has
been made into a whole, a separate and transcendent whole, which is
his sovereign living Person, and by which the other whole, the im-
manent (sic] whole or the body politic, is ruled from above. When
Jean Bodin says that the sovereign Prince is the image of God, this
phrase must be understood in its full force, and means that the Sov-
ereign-submitted to God, but accountable only to Him-tran-
scends the political whole just as God transcends the cosmos. 151
This, Maritain goes on to say, "was the purpose for which the
word Sovereignty was coined"152 in the vernaculars of modern politi-
cal theory: to claim and identify a supreme independence and su-
preme power which is a right both natural and inalienable, which
148 See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE 151 (1989).
149 See PENNINGTON, supra note 146, at 271-72.
150 Id. at 277-78.
151 MARITAIN, supra note 72, at 34.
152 Id. at 37-38.
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power and independence are in their proper sphere over and sepa-
rate from, not a part of, the whole over which they sit.' 3 Maritain
sums it up: Sovereignty is a property which is absolute and indivisible,
which cannot be participated in and admits of no degrees, and which
belongs to the Sovereign independently of the. political whole, as a
right of his own.15 4 "We cannot use the concept of Sovereignty," Mari-
tain continues, "without evoking, even unawares, that original conno-
tation," 55 And should anyone wonder why the term "sovereign"
resonates so powerfully, one has only to think of the power of the
English prose of Thomas Hobbes, according to which the would-be
sovereign Leviathan securer of peace and order mutates into nothing
short of a "mortal God."15 6
We shall return to the question of whether we can, pace Maritain,
use the term without committing a trespass, but first we must canvass
more of the history to which Maritain was reacting. With the contri-
butions of Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes, we stand at the threshold
of the modern English problematic of sovereignty, which the colonists
inherited and bequeathed to us. In the post-Hobbesian English land-
scape populated and cultivated by Blackstone, John Austin, and A.V.
Dicey, sovereignty as the undivided power of the state or "the Crown,"
and not itself subject to fundamental law, was constantly on the re-
bound. Hobbes was "denounced but never really repudiated ..... 157
The modern nation-states emerged, and it was characteristic of them
to make claims, over a territorially delimited expanse, to sovereignty,
that is, to undivided supreme or absolute power of which earlier
princes, with their cities and roaming empires and feudal structures
and estates, were innocent. "The key intellectual argument for sover-
eignty" of this new sort, as Gianfranco Poggi observes, was "that law
and order can only be maintained within each territory if one power
alone possesses a distinct prerogative," and that power, according to
Poggi, was "qualitatively different from all other social forces, because (it
is] exclusively concerned with a distinctive set of interests, of a specifi-
cally political nature."15 Again Maritain:
Sovereignty is a property which is absolute and indivisible,
which cannot be participated in and admits of no degrees, and
153 Id. at 38.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 TviomAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 114 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
157 GORDON S. Woon, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
348 (1969).
158 GiANFRANCO POcGI, THE STATE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 44
(1990) (emphasis added).
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which belongs to the Sovereign independently of the political
whole, as a right of his own.
Such is genuine Sovereignty, that Sovereignty which the abso-
lute kings believed they possessed, and the notion of which was in-
herited from them by the absolute States, and the full significance
of which has been brought to light in the Hegelian State-and, long
before Hegel, in the Hobbesian Mortal God.159
On the Continent, which Maritain knew firsthand, territorial gov-
ernments with active aspirations to absolutism became virtual com-
monplaces; we ordinarily refer to them as totalitarianisms. England
was no exception in its aspirations to sovereignty of an absolute sort,
but behind the veneer of claims of the absolute sovereignty lodges in
parliament was practiced more or less consistently a "flexible constitu-
tionalism," as Professor Pennington calls it.160 Sovereignty's great
modern champion, Professor Dicey, kept up appearances when he
opined that English judges facing acts of sovereign Parliament that
would appear to themselves to violate the moral law would, though
powerless to overrule them, give them "whenever possible ... such an
interpretation . . .as may be consistent with the doctrines both of
private and of international morality."161
While the English kept on keeping up appearances, the colonists
got busy and, as Justice Kennedy would say of their work more than
two centuries later, they "split the atom of sovereignty" (though they
did so in a way different from the one Kennedy had in mind in the
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton opinion in which he made the
claim). 16 2 Gordon Wood, in The Creation of the American Republic, ob-
serves that, "[the doctrine of sovereignty] was the single most impor-
tant abstraction of politics in the entire Revolutionary era."' 6 3 What
caused the colonists to cathect this question was the judgment, made
common by the growth, on all sides, of nation-states bent on centrali-
zation and order, that there must be a supreme and undivided power
over what we regard as a "state."'16 4 The colonists by and large re-
garded this as a fact to be reckoned with, a threat to be insured
against. The rhythm and direction of their debates, of course, led to
their taking hold of the ideas of Montesquieu according to which
159 MARITAIN, supra note 72, at 38.
160 PENNINGTON, supra note 146, at 285.
161 A.V. DicE-, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ThE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 63
(10th ed. 1959).
162 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
163 Woon, supra note 157, at 345.
164 Id.
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schemes of power would be divided and separated, checked and bal-
anced, both horizontally and vertically. Against the Federalist argu-
ments in favor of such coordinate and shared "sovereignties," the
Antifederalists persisted in denying that such a thing was possible.
The idea of shared sovereignty was "a solecism in politics," a logical
and practical impossibility;' 65 sovereignty just meant absolute, sepa-
rate power over a territory and its people.
This apparent aporia James Wilson (later, Justice Wilson) dis-
solved by agreeing that the divisions of power and authority in the pro-
posed scheme of government did not attempt the impossibility of
dividing sovereignty. In accord with the Antifederalists, but pace Jus-
tice Kennedy, Wilson held that sovereignty remained undivided, resid-
ing inviolably in the people themselves. Confrontation with the English,
indeed the Blackstonian concept of sovereignty led the prevailing
American theorists, thanks to Wilson, to relocate it in the people-at-
large. In Gordon Wood's description:
It was left to James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
to deal most effectively with the Antifederalist conception of sover-
eignty. More boldly and more fully than anyone else, Wilson devel-
oped the argument that would eventually become the basis of all
Federalist thinking. He challenged the Antifederalists' use of the
concept of sovereignty not by attempting to divide it or to deny it,
but by doing what the Americans had done to the English in 1774,
by turning it against its proponents.1 66
"'The supreme power,' said Wilson, 'is in them; and in them,
even when a constitution is formed, and government is in operation,
the supreme power still remains." 67 He continued: "'A portion of
their authority they, indeed, delegate; but they delegate that portion
in whatever manner, in whatever measure, for whatever time, to
whatever persons, and on whatever conditions they choose to fix."'168
V. MAKING METAPHYSICAL SENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY, DIGNITY, AND
SOVEREIGN DIGNITY-AND OURSELVES
And so we come back to the present, perhaps better informed of
what people, including Justices of the Supreme Court, might be talk-
ing about and claiming when they impute "sovereignty," and, thus,
165 Id. at 528.
166 Id. at 530.
167 Id. at 599 (quoting JAmEs WILSON, Comparison of the Constitution of the United
States, with that of Great Britain, in TiqE WoRKs OF JAMES WILSON 309, 317 (Robert
Green McCloskey ed., 1967)).
168 Id. at 599-600.
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better prepared to answer our question about whether "we" should
grant the current Court's claims on behalf of sovereignty. The now
leading ground the Court offers in justification of the immunity to
suit it finds in the states, we should be clear, concerns their sover-
eignty and its concomitant dignity. Arguments of the fiscal sort have
abated (though of course the fisc cannot but remain a powerful force
in the background). Professor Meltzer captures some of the current
situation in his summary of the rationale of Alden:
The Court did not, in fact, seek to justify its decision in Alden
with a careful analysis of the relationship of the new immunity it
recognized to the purposes of constitutional federalism. Instead,
the Court's normative defense of state sovereign immunity rested
on two somewhat more abstract notions: the dignity of states and
the sovereignty of states.' 69
I say that Meltzer captures "some" but not all of the current situation
because it is less than clear that the Court's claims are, as Meltzer
claims, exclusively "normative."
The Court's claims, I suggested at the start, should strike us, while
they still can, as bizarre. Part of what needs untangling, if we are to
make sense of what the Court is claiming with these appeals that are
"somewhat evanescent,"1 70 is whether the Court is making descriptive
claims or normative claims. The language favored by the Court, of
which we have quoted many examples, seems rather clearly to postu-
late that the States simply are, in virtue of their given nature, sover-
eign. To what has already been quoted one can add inter alia the
language of Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Seminole case and Justice
Thomas in the Maritime case: Their arguments proceed from what "'is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty,"' the internally quoted phrase
being Hamilton's in Federalist No. 81.17 The normative element in
the Court's current campaign is to bring us along to treating the states
as they, in virtue of their inherent nature, ought to be treated.
There is an unmistakable mismatch between these ontologically
thick claims, as to the inherent nature of the fifty states, and a Court
that is, across the ideological spectrum, increasingly abstemious in its
ontological inventory. Although the quote from Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey which I included in the beginning 172
169 Meltzer, supra note 43, at 1038.
170 Id. at 1039.
171 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
81 (Alexander Hamilton)); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,
752 (2002) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
172 See supra text accompanying note 69.
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is, admittedly, the limit case of the Court's anti-metaphysical leanness,
it is continuous with much else that the Court is doing. The conserva-
tive wing of the Court, after all, prefers a version of legal positivism
("textualism") to a legal process porously informed and disciplined by
the (ontologically thick) natural law. The Court's exception to its
metaphysical leanness for metaphysical abundance on behalf of "sov-
ereignty" and "sovereign dignity" cries out for explanation and justifi-
cation. How can it be that, individuals do not have inherent natures,
but states do?
In light of this exotic possibility, I want now to ask what happens
if we take the court at its "sovereign dignity" word. Metaphysics isn't
necessarily all bad. What comes, then, if we try to unpack these meta-
physically thick claims? Can we, do we, find persuasive the Court's
claims? Do our-do your-ontological inventories bear them out?
Before answering, I should anticipate an objection. As men-
tioned, the members of the Court who were in the majority in the
cases generating the "sovereign dignity" jurisprudence are, in varying
degrees, the proponents on the Court of that technique of construc-
tion called textualism, a version of legal positivism according to which
legal texts are to be given effect according to what "meaning" they
would have elicited in an ordinary, reasonable reader at the time of
their enactment. 73 Although the Justices loyal to the "conventional"
approach descending from Hans used to make text-based arguments
on behalf of the conventional view and their expansions of it, increaE-
ingly the text is eclipsed by those meta-textual "postulates which limit
and control 74 or, by historical-cum-metaphysical claims of the sort
advanced by Justice Thomas in Northern Insurance. "A consequence of
this Court's recognition of preratification sovereignty . .. ."75
Not only is constitutional text not supportive of, it is also not what
is driving the majority's affirmations of the states' sovereign dignity.
Something other than the text is leading the charge. If, then, per im-
possible God mandated "textualism" as the mode of that document's
construction, the Court's meta-textual arguments would be ultra vires
and beside the point. But exactly because textualism is, pace the textu-
alists, necessarily just one among many competing legitimate theories
of interpretation of our Constitution, the majority's embrace of non-
textual elements, even metaphysically baroque ones, cannot be ruled
out of court a priori. Though these claims might render the textualists
liable to the charge of hypocrisy (that compliment, as La Rochefou-
173 See, e.g., ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-25 (1997).
174 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
175 N. Ins. Co. v. Chatham County, 126 S. Ct. 1689, 1693 (2006).
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cauld observes, "vice pays to virtue"' 76 ), still these elements must be
listened to, tested, proved or disproved. Claims about the world, in-
cluding about states and those who create them, are always subject to
testing.
Therefore, what are we to make of these claims-not as issues of
textual meaning but as claims about the world and about ourselves?
Some among us might reply "nothing." Playing the materialist,
though, makes nonsense of everything at the same time, both sover-
eign dignity and all the rest of the non-empirical meaning and value
by which and on which we live. We need to be careful, lest unwittingly
we remove and reduce ourselves to a world of only sticks and
stones.177 Daniel Farber approaches (or reaches) such a leaden world
when he trivializes or dismisses "sovereignty" on the ground that it
"lacks any physical existence." 178 Never mind that much that matters
most is not "physical"-or have you touched love and been bruised by
hatred? It is an aggressive pulverization that limits the real to what
springs from dust.
The challenge to separate metaphysically rich claims that are
(probably) true from those that are not, including those that concern
what is not "physical," is at an apex in our legal undertakings, in which
the very physical reality that is coercion always lurks. As Joseph Vining
and Steven Smith have been pointing out in a series of articles and
books, our legal practice as a whole has been conspicuously resistant
to giving up metaphysical claims that the typical modern "educated"
mindset, bent on the physical, is poised to deny.' 79 To pick just one
example, two-thirds of a century after Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins180
176 FRAN¢ois LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 43 (Stuart D. Warner and St~phane
Douard, trans., 2001).
177 See Brennan, Meaning's Edge, supra note 74, at 2068.
178 DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 33 (2003). Farber's immediate refer-
ent is "popular sovereignty," but on his ontological inventory, there is no reason to
think that any other possible sort of "sovereignty" would fare better. Farber opines
that the dispute over sovereignty "is reminiscent of medieval disputes about the na-
ture of the Trinity. It is not in any real sense a question of fact or even one of law."
Id. at 29. One can be grateful to learn, from a book concerned with something as
terrestrial as the U.S. Constitution and costing just $27.50 (plus tax), the priceless and
lofty truth that there is no matter of fact about the Trinity.
179 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 63; JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE
AUTHORITARIAN (1986) [hereninafter VINING, AUTHORITATIVE]; VINING, supra note 75;
JOSEPH VINING, THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD (2004) [hereninafter VINING, SONG
SPARROW]; Smith, supra note 62; Vining, supra note 24; Joseph Vining, Legal Affinities,
23 GA. L. REv. 1035 (1989).
180 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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overruled Swift v. Tyson,181 mainstream legal practice and discourse
still regard decided cases not as "the law" but rather 
as "evidence" of
what the law is; this commitment to the law's preexisting 
what we say it
is, is borne out in the Court's increasingly extensive 
insistence on ret-
roactive application of decisions.
182 Some jurists do not talk this way
at all; others credit such talk to the bad faith 
of the cartel. But the
pertinent point Vining and Smith have pursued 
is that the persistence
of this talk, more than a century after Holmes 
did his acidic best, sug-
gests that there is more than nonsense in our 
workaday jurispruden-
tial commitments, even though these commitments 
embrace a world
that lacks spatial coordinates. WhatJ.L. Mackie 
would have regarded
as "metaphysically queer" entities may turn out 
to be our legal staff of
life.' 83
But what, specifically, of sovereignty, dignity, and 
sovereign dig-
nity? If we imagine or stipulate that the real is 
limited to what we can
see and touch and taste, then they are at best, 
all of them, nothing but
verbal nonsense-constructs that obscure reality 
and purport to fulfill
our wishes for what we are not entitled to. Reacting 
against what he
refers to as the Court's "metaphysics of sovereignty," 
H. Jefferson Pow-
ell commends Holmes's counsel against such 
arrogations: "We must
think things not words, or at least we must 
constantly translate our
words into the facts for which they stand, if we are 
to keep to the real
and the true."18 4 No one, I suppose, can be opposed 
to keeping to
the real and the true; the trick, however, is not 
peremptorily to ad-
judge what does not rise to the level of thingness or Farber's 
physical-
ity to be unreal and untrue. Neither sovereignty 
nor dignity is a
"thing" or a physical presence, but might either 
or both be real? What
are "the facts" to which these abstract nouns 
refer?
The past half-century's international declarations 
of human
rights teem with assertions that all humans have 
"dignity" and conse-
quent (or correlative) natural rights to humane treatment. 
The world
to whom those declarations are declared continues 
to perpetrate and
tolerate gross treatment of human persons; frequently, 
indeed, the
"sovereignty" of nation states is invoked, and not always unsuccess-
fully, to justify blocking so-called humanitarian intervention.'
18 5 Does
the volume of unchecked atrocity against our 
fellow humans mean
181 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
182 See SMITH, supra note 63, at 61-62.
183 J.L. MACKE, ETHICS 38-42 (1977).
184 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT 
ON WORDS 35 (2002) (quoting Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes, Jr.).
185 See FERNANDO R. TESON, A PHILOSOPHY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 39-47, 57-66
(1998).
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that we silently or whisperingly conclude that dignity and natural
rights are legal fictions? I would venture that, if pressed, most of "us"
would insist, in one idiom or another, that attribution of dignity and
natural rights to humans springs from our discovery of transcendent
value in human personhood as such, value of a sort that precludes the
commodification of the person. Yes, in law as elsewhere there operate
tendencies, to which we all succumb from time to time, to imagine
that dignity is the illusion and mechanistic determinism (which deter-
mines us to imagine dignity) the reality. Dignity is impossible to see
and, at least sometimes, hard to believe (in). But, as Joseph Vining
has brought out so beautifully, again in The Song Sparrow and the
Child,186 when we try to dissolve or resolve the loved one or even the
enemy into his constituent parts, when we imagine that what we face
in those eyes of love or hate is exactly the consequence of "'a world
that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force,'"187 we
have lost something real. Indeed, we have lost the person, the value,
the dignified-or vilified-one. 8 8 No one but a fool vilifies a rock;
no mere system of physical particles vilifies.
Now, even assuming what on-duty materialists will deny, to wit,
that humans have dignity even though no one can point you toward it
or touch it, can any such thing be said of a state? Before an answer is
possible, some distinctions must be made. I have been proceeding-
because our question concerning the United States Supreme Court
on the states' sovereign immunity has to this point allowed it-as if we
are largely agreed about what a "state" is, the only question at issue
being whether such "entities" enjoy sovereignty, dignity, and sovereign
dignity. But "state" is not a univocal term. As it emerged in the mod-
ern context shaped by Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, and their succes-
sors, frequently it refers to a territorially bounded people that is under
a self-contained government or just to the self-contained leadership
over that territorially bounded people. 8 9 It was "State" understood in
something like these terms that led to the conundrum of whether "the
several States"' 90 could form a national government without losing
their identity as "State[s].' 191
186 VINING, SONG SPARROW, supra note 179.
187 Id. at 114 (quoting JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 86-87
(1994)).
188 See id. at 12-21.
189 See MARITAIN, supra note 72, at 12-19.
190 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
191 MARITAIN, supra note 72, at 17 (explaining the absolutist notion that the State
"is a whole unto itself, the very political whole in its supreme degree of unity and
individuality").
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Understood in another sense, "state" refers to the 
"special agency
endowed with uppermost power, for the sake 
of justice and law' 92 as
concerns a particular body politic. By "body politic" 
I mean the whole
of a distinct people united in relations of justice (and commingled
with aspirations to the same). Of this whole the state is the topmost
part; it is not a separate power. It is a web of institutions 
and energy
joined to the whole and serving the interests of that whole.
19 3 As to
this latter sense of state, that is, the instrument 
of government of a
given body politic, called into existence for the 
common and individ-
ual goods of the body politic, the answer is obvious 
enough: it is bu-
reaucracy, without necessarily all negative connotations 
the word now
bears in this post-Weberian world.
If there be dignity in this arrangement, it belongs 
to the whole
body politic inasmuch as it has organized itself into 
a unity structured,
thanks in part to this top-most bureaucracy, in 
relations ofjustice. Jac-
ques Maritain saw this, that the state and the 
body politic must earn
their dignity. After summarizing all the temptations 
to irresponsibility
that a state must resist, Maritain concludes:
Then only will the highest functions of the State-to 
ensure the law
and facilitate the free development of the body 
politic-be re-
stored, and the sense of the State be regained by its 
citizens. Then
only will the State achieve its true dignity, which 
comes not from
power and prestige, but from the exercise 
of justice. 194
Trouble emerges (and predictably) when the topmost leadership 
of
that discrete people purports to emerge as separate 
from and above
the people, a moral person with its own rights 
(and privileges!), a li-
cense to ignore claims of justice. Immunizing the "sovereign" 
from
claims of justice is no way to earn dignity.
The question of the dignity of a state can be approached 
from
another angle. In recent years, the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged
that "state action" can cause "expressive harms."'
95 According to
Richard Pildes, "an expressive harm is one that 
results from the ideas
or attitudes expressed through a governmental 
action rather than
from the more tangible or material consequences 
the action brings
about."1 96 The Court's explicit cognizing of 
"expressive harms" has
concerned citizens injured by states, but some scholars have 
now sug-
192 Id. at 23.
193 See id. at 9-12.
194 Id. at 19.
195 Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: 
Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL S-ruD. 725, 747-50, 
755-60 (1998).
196 Id. at 725, 755.
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gested that the Court's solicitude for the dignitary interests of the fifty
states is an attempt to prevent the infliction on them of expressive
harms. 19 7 How would this work? In the former context, the Court was
seeking to protect, say, members of racial minorities from feeling dis-
respected by their government's use of race in line-drawing, or mem-
bers of religious minorities from feeling alienated by their
government's privileging and endorsing dominant religions. 19
In the current context, whom might the Court be protecting?
One might be tempted to say that the Court cannot possibly be pro-
tecting the states, because states, unlike citizens, do not have feelings.
One commentator has complained of "anthropomorphization of
states [that] simply reflects a category mistake."1 99 To be sure, if the
Court is heard to say-and sometimes it does seem to come pretty
close to saying-that the states qua states feel things, then so much
worse for the Court (and those who believe what it says). But perhaps
there is more here than meets the eye, since it is worth considering
that states can be made worse off-that is, harmed or injured-with-
out their being able to know as much.
Consider first, by way of analogy, the Boy Scouts of America, or a
religious congregation. If people begin to speak of either group as a
haven for pedophiles and other predators, its capacity to succeed in its
corporate mission is reduced as people who (might) interact with the
Scouts or the congregation internalize negative associations with those
groups. Neither the Scouts nor the congregation as such is, strictly
speaking, sentient or intelligent, but both societies, the Scouts and the
congregation, is harmed by people's reduced understanding of them.
Who wants to associate himself with a group described as a refuge of
abusers?
Returning from these groups to the fifty states, we can ask
whether they are invulnerable to reduced appreciation of their nature
and stature. Would not the states as such be worse off if the Supreme
Court in its opinions began regularly modifying the word "states" with
the little word "mere?" On the correct assumption that people actu-
ally hear and internalize some of what the current Court writes, the
affirmative answer is obvious enough. But does a state's being sub-
jected to unconsented suit by a private party work a similar harm?
The Court says that it does, but ordinary human beings do not lose
their dignity, or have it compromised, when they respond to reasona-
197 See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 81 (2001).
198 Pildes, supra note 195, at 747-50.
199 Caminker, supra note 197, at 85.
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ble judicial process. Rape is one thing; just summonses and proce-
dure, another. What do states lose by complying with such a process?
Potentially, something from their treasury; but again, the Court has
denied that fiscal prophylaxis is a or the primary justification for (sov-
ereign) immunity to sUit. 20 0 Perhaps the states would risk losing the
status (or appearance) of indifferent inviolability? Sure enough, but
as we learn in the Hebrew Scripture, even God-who, after all, is sov-
ereign if anyone be-allowed Abraham to press (and press again) the
question of justice with respect to sparing any just men who might be
found in Sodom.20 1 God does end up ending the city, of course, but
first God listened (and listened again) to the call of justice.2 2 Was
God demeaned in so doing?
God can take care of Himself, we might reasonably conclude; but
states, like the Boy Scouts and religious congregations, need help if
they are to be healthy. This is indeed true, both as to the whole body-
politic and as to its top-most part with delegated responsibility for gov-
erning. The Supreme Court, for its part, seems to be doing what it
can to reinvigorate the states. The non-commandeering cases, such as
New York v. United States203 and Printz v. United States,20 4 are doing just
that, of course, and so, too, are the cases that, by imputing sovereign
dignity to the states, bid us understand them-and thus ourselves, for
we are not separate from our states-in richer and deeper terms. The
goal of understanding bodies-politic and their government in terms
worthy of their importance is hard to quarrel with.
However, in its "expressive harm" jurisprudence, the Court is, as a
descriptive matter and a normative matter both, inculcating the judg-
ment that the states are entities that enjoy dignitary interests that both
do and should trump citizens' dignitary interests. 20 5 Caminker offers
this diagnosis of a problem:
[A]ccording to the Court's phraseology, it is precisely because private
persons are deemed beneath the states in station that suits by the
former constitute an "indignity" to the latter....
... One therefore cannot easily confine the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine to making a statement about the proper relationship
between Congress and the states; it necessarily makes a statement
about the relationship between people and the states as well, and
200 Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002).
201 See Walter Brueggemann, The Endless Task of Interpretation, 53 MERCER L. REx,.
1019, 1025-26 (2002).
202 Id. at 1025.
203 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
204 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
205 Caminker, supra note 197, at 84-87.
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here the expression seems squarely antithetical 
to the presupposed
by popular sovereignty.
20 6
Assuming that popular sovereignty is our baseline, 
Caminker ob-
jects that claims about other sovereignties and their greater 
dignities
are unsustainable because they are inconsistent 
with our baseline po-
litical self-understanding.
2 0 7
To this I would offer two, related replies. 
The first is that it is a
familiar though not unchallenged doctrine 
of much political theory
that the good of people as a whole, the 
common good of the body-
politic, is prior to the good(s) of the individuals it serves. 
Though this
idea about "the priority of the common 
good" is often and correctly
associated with pre-liberal political theory, 
the mere fact of individu-
als' inevitable dependence (if they are to survive and 
flourish) on rela-
tionships and institutions larger than themselves 
militates in favor of
acknowledging the ineliminable priority 
of the body-politic and its
proper institutions. Without involvement 
in relations of justice and
the benefit of good government, individuals 
are destined to exploita-
tion and unnecessary collision with impossibility. 
Even a perfectly vir-
tuous people would need government authoritatively 
to determine on
which side of the road individuals are to drive. 
Though I cannot de-
velop the point further here, I would just suggest 
that Caminker
would be quite off-base in supposing that 
the worthy tools of self-gov-
ernment of persons possessed of dignity 
do not possess at least an
equal dignity.
The second prong of my reply to Caminker's 
diagnosis concerns
the suggestion that "we the people" are sovereign, 
which brings us back
to the question of who the "we" are that 
is asked by the Supreme
Court to assent to claims of sovereignty.
VI. SUBJECTS, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
SELF-GovERNMENT
No one disputes that the terms "sovereign" 
and "sovereignty" are
absent from our Constitution. Justice Wilson 
was right.2° s Nor can
anyone deny that Justice Wilson was correct 
that the colonial rhetori-
cians sometimes described and thought 
of themselves and their co-
travelers as "sovereign" (whether as a whole, or as constituted 
colony
by colony, state by state, does not matter 
for present purposes). And
the colonists did so, as observed above, in 
order to wrest power from
206 Id. at 87.
207 Cf Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: 
Questioning the Role
of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1921, 
1927-28 (2003) (consider-
ing the contextual value of "role dignity" assigned 
to groups, including states).
208 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454-55 
(1793) (Wilson, J.).
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the Crown. But as both the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble to the Constitution signal, theirs was not a contest of power
for power's sake. They spoke the language of sovereignty in order to
best the enemy on its own turf; they did not, when it came time to
construct their own instruments of government, reintroduce elements
or vestiges of sovereignty, though there is no denying that their under-
standable failure to shelve the word altogether in their debates, in-
cluding in the influential propaganda The Federalist Papers (especially
No. 81), gives today's would-be absolutizers linguistic fragments to de-
ploy in distraction from clear talk and healthy debate about self-gov-
ernment and justice.20 9
We observed that the pre-Hobbesian users of sovereignty's Latin
counterparts frequently had benign ends in mind. When today we
use the English words "sovereign" and "sovereignty," however, when
today we use them as the Supreme Court does and bids us do, can we
but verge on falsehood? It was Maritain's judgment that "[it] he two
concepts of Sovereignty and Absolutism have been forged together on
the same anvil. They must be scrapped together."210 Maritain wrote
these words in the aftermath of the Second World War, nearly half a
century before much of Europe would again see states and their gov-
ernments bottomed in justice and open to human dignity. No one
can think that our American government, whatever its shortcomings,
approaches the evils embodied in government that Maritain knew and
opposed. Also, however lazy the American people's habits of citizen-
ship have become, we remain a people who conceive of our govern-
ment as of ourselves, by ourselves, and for ourselves; and we do in fact
have the last word on what we shall do with ourselves, in the sense that
no higher norms will impose themselves upon our intelligence like a
seal upon hot wax. Still, I want to insist that when talking about the
people and their power and responsibility of self-government, Mari-
tain is right that "[t] he point is that the term needed is not Sover-
eignty."2 11 It is possible for us to use the term in comparatively benign
ways, but, unless we reduce it to idiolect, it cannot help but risk to
mislead.
If this seems paranoid, or at least unduly scrupulous, recall that
part of what we are doing in law is to create community through lan-
guage and meaning. At the end of the day, law can concern coercion,
a fact that to some minds makes approaching law from the angle of
209 Cf NOONAN, supra note 60, at 80-84, 138-40 (discussing the different mean-
ings of the term "sovereignty" used by the Founders and in contemporary society).
210 MARITAIN, supra note 72, at 53.
211 Id. at 49.
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language and meaning appear naive or co-opted. But inasmuch as we
recognize that coercion does lurk behind claims made "in the name
of the law," is not the exigence of language doing its work-of persua-
sion and justification, and of creating the meaning of what we are
doing-at an apex? As Bernard Lonergan mused wryly, "Is everyone
to use force against everyone to convince everyone that force is beside
the point?"212 Force and violence frequently take the form of the
bludgeon; other times they cloak themselves in the bullying argu-
ment, the conversational strategy that substitutes stipulated obvi-
ousness for the opportunity for persuasion that might (or might not)
lead to conviction. In a chapter titled, "Meaning What You Say," JB.
White has illustrated the social violence, intellectual and personal,
done byjudicial opinions, and other writings "in the name of the law,"
that trade on the disingenuous. 213 In the present context, we might
be alert to cliches, false confidence, oversimplification, and grandilo-
quence that whips up castles in the sky.
Talk of sovereignty inevitably imports specters of absolute and
separate power. Does your ontological inventory include persons, or
separate units, or collectivities possessed of absolute (or near-abso-
lute?) and separate power? Alternatively or concomitantly, are "we
the people" godlike in our control over ourselves and our destiny?
Are we not bound by the natural law? Though it awaits our free em-
brace, the natural law, with the natural rights it imports, binds us
whether we acknowledge it or not. (We flout it at our peril, but that's
another story). A true sovereign is not bound.
Sovereignty is one case, you may say. Perhaps, by contrast, your
ontological inventory does include dignity. But as a property of the
state, that part of the body politic by which we govern ourselves? If
this were to be plausibly true, first we would have to affirm and give
effect to the dignity of human persons; only then would we be in posi-
tion coherently to appreciate the dignity of our creations. Even so,
false sacralization of the tools of self-government creates idols that can
abuse. In particular, (unless rigorously qualified) talk of dignity in-
hering in the contingent instruments of self-government detracts
from the hard-won dignity of bodies-politic, of those whose dignity it is
both to create and discipline those instruments.
Should we not conclude that with its ontologically aggressive
claims in terms of "sovereign dignity" the Court is trying to justify con-
troversiale per controversialius, the controversial by the more controver-
212 BEmARD LONERGAN, INSIGHT 632 (1978).
213 James Boyd White, Meaning What You Say, in LAw IN THE LIBERAL ARTS 109,
127-33 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
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sial? With respect to dignity, the Court is asking us to affirm the tools
of our creation what it finds hard or impossible to affirm with respect
to ourselves. And with respect to sovereignty, is not the Court pur-
porting to colonize what is not its or ours to claim? Pace Maritain,
there are benign uses of the word sovereignty, and of a related dignity
analogically understood.2 1 4 But it would be a stretch, I submit, to con-
clude that the Court's claims of sovereignty, dignity, and sovereign
dignity are good for us, our self-understanding, and our political
whither. Daniel Farber objects that the Court calls for "veneration" of
the states as a matter of "faith. '2 1 5 Overreaction is no help. It is
enough to say that the Court has exaggerated, in distorted and unten-
able ways, the states in relation to their creators.
The Rehnquist Court has averred, per Justice Kennedy in Alden,
that the states "retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of
sovereignty." 216 Authority is an appealing alternative focus, need, and
aspiration of a self-governing people. The Rehnquist Court, fixed as it
was on sovereignty as such, did not explain what constitutes political
authority.217 I would suggest that a focus on what gives rise to-and
what undercuts-genuine political and legal authority would redirect
the jurisprudence of (sovereign) immunity to its proper concerns
rooted in justice and the rule of law.
To all this we should add that, with respect to the Court's honora-
ble wish to implement the Constitution's distributions of power (call it
"federalism," if you like), neither sovereignty nor dignity, nor even the
Eleventh Amendment particularly, is helpful, let alone necessary. If
the Court is working to ensure the vitality of the states as distinct cen-
ters of government, if ours is not to be one national government in
fifty-some departments, what the states need is real governing work to
do and a measure of autonomy in which to do it.218 This, the Court
214 See supra text accompanying notes 210-11.
215 Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New
Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 1133, 1144 (2000) ("In the end, the Court seems
left only with its faith in the innate sovereign dignity of state governments. This ven-
eration of state governments-rather than history, precedent, or policy-is the main-
stay of the New Federalism. The inherent dignity of state governments is not an
intuitive truth for all of us. But apparently it is an intuitive matter-more than that, a
matter of faith-for five Justices.").
216 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
217 On authority, rather than sovereignty, as an aim and necessary condition of
just law and politics, see Brennan, Locating Authority, supra note 74.
218 See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1,
13-15 (2004) (arguing for state "autonomy" instead of state "sovereignty"); see also
Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Gar-
cia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 400 ("[Tlhe model of participatory government, which
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should be after; at the very least, the text of the Tenth Amendment
calls for such an arrangement. That text, not the bloated and bloat-
ing notions of sovereignty and dignity we have been considering, nor
imprecise notions of devolution and subsidiarity that are alien to our
particular constitutional structure and tradition should serve as the
Court's principal guides in this area.
I observed at the beginning that lawyers are always turning to
texts, and just now I commended the text of the Tenth Amendment to
the Court. But what of the Eleventh Amendment? Unless and until it
is amended, the Court should give effect to it according to its terms,
which are jurisdictional. This would require overruling Hans and its
progeny, something there is, I suggest, more than ample reason to
do.2 19 But saying this, I do not by misadventure commend to the
Court a naive textualism. The Court's conservatives' willingness to
look beyond text to the principles that control-to unwritten law, we
might call it-has common sense, not to mention our long constitu-
tional tradition, to recommend it; it's just most unfortunate that the
five took the implausible cause of sovereignty as the one in which to
try applying the best methods of our legal tradition. Cultures in crisis,
as ours is, sometimes try to make of their exemplary written texts for-
tresses of paper; the inadequacy of parchment barriers inevitably
pokes through, but not always successfully. People engaged in intelli-
gent and disciplined self-government create texts as aids to such self-
government, not as substitutes for the same. What is written down is
not the law, it is what those who have office to say what the law is turn
to when called upon to speak the law to a world that is being created.
The temptation to sovereignize the partial, if succumbed to, leads to
empty but poisonous idols. Joseph Vining writes:
There is doubtless a terrible tension in what both lawyers and
theologians do, given what tools and methods are put at their dispo-
sal for doing it. The tension is the tension, indeed terror of respon-
sibility in the face of the unknown and not the certainly knowable.
goes back as far as Aristotle, views political activity not as instrumental toward achiev-
ing a proportionate share in the distribution of available resources, to be used in a
variety of private pursuits, but rather as a good in itself, something essentially impli-
cated in the very concept of human freedom.").
219 See also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (suggesting "in-
justice," "confusion" and "unconstitutionality" as justifications for overruling estab-
lished court doctrine); cf Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis:
Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260, 1271 (1990) ("[D]epartures
from stare decisis are justified either where changed circumstances have so under-
mined the prior case as to deprive it of its legitimacy, or where later cases have re-
vealed glaring inconsistencies in the law.").
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Lawyers and theologians reach for the sovereign, look to the sover-
eign, speak for the sovereign, something or someone to pay serious
attention to, or, to use the liturgical term, to praise. They turn to
texts. But the texts to which they turn are selected and are old,
necessarily from the past, requiring translation over time and be-
tween languages and places, year to year, decade to decade. 220
In an earlier work, Vining explained:
Talk of rights and rules of a static kind, projecting an image of
law standing off by itself, obscures the focus that legal rules have in
fact, always a decision that must be made, at the edge of lives that
have not been lived before, in a world that has not been seen
before. 22 1
But all of this depends-does it not?-on who "we" are. If we or
some of us were mere objects, we or they would make a suitable field
for manipulation by pseudo sovereigns and petit potentates embold-
ened and licensed by would-be mortal gods, using the sovereign rules
of a sovereign reigning over a sovereign state. My analysis from the
beginning to this point has assumed that we, all of us, are not mere
objects, but human persons whose job it is, if you will, to implement
the natural law. Yes, we can misbehave and behave aimlessly, but it is
our very dignity to be able as intelligent persons, unlike brute beasts
and inanimate objects, to say about what we choose and pursue that it
is good, good for us and those who are the same as we in being
human. It is good for us to develop our human capacities, and for
this, order and the government that can arrange it are necessary. Our
rational subjectivity thus requires us to commit to creation of and par-
ticipation in institutions of self-government and relations of justice.
No instrument of self-government we create will be perfect, so we will
need to be committed to its monitoring and improvement. Some-
times government will become so bad that we will be obligated to
throw it off by revolution; but otherwise, notwithstanding its imperfec-
tions, our duty will be to sustain and improve it, voting bums out of
office when we can. 222 We ourselves, perhaps through representatives
but not through something from beyond us, must govern. 2 23
220 Vining, supra note 179, at 1050.
221 VINING, AUTHORITATIVE, supra note 179, at 218.
222 See STONER, supra note 138, at 36 ("Instead of saying that obedience is man-
dated only in that regime whose laws conform to a universal standard of goodness,
[Lord Coke's view] makes obedience to a particular government the first instance of a
man's obedience to law.").
223 For an account that brings together, in a way consistent with the argument
advanced here, the elements of sovereignty, authority, democracy, and law, see YVEs
R. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 144-94 (1993).
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To state or national sovereignty Justice Wilson counter-posed the
sovereignty of the people; but, though closer to the truth, even Justice
Wilson's view seems, to me, to work a corrupting influence on our self-
understanding. If sovereignty is an absolute and separate power, "ob-
viously the power and independence of the people are not supreme
separately from and above the people themselves. Of the people as well as of
the body politic," Maritain continues, "we have to say, not that they
are sovereign, but that they have a natural right to full autonomy, or to
self-government."224 But this "natural right" is not the end of it.
Judge Noonan, in his study of America's experiment in religious
liberty, concluded that for the wars of religion and principled viola-
tion of conscience, America has found, in its commitment of Free Ex-
ercise, a "sovereign remedy."22 5 That remedy is sovereign because it
allows us human subjects to meet our indefeasible duty to inform con-
science and freely follow the will of the sovereign God.2 26 The ques-
tion is broader than religion and its free exercise, however. We must
resist the Court's and others' claims on behalf of false sovereigns, not
because we ourselves are individual sovereigns or because together we
constitute a corporate sovereign, but because, with respect to seeking
and instantiating the good, personal and common both, we operate
under an obligation that is nothing short of sovereign. The natural
law that gives birth to this right of ours to self-government is itself our
intelligent participation as human subjects in the Eternal Law, the
mind of the sovereign God sweetly disposing all things to their proper
ends.
I understand that what I have just said about who we are presup-
poses metaphysical claims that are excluded by many people's onto-
logical inventories. However, in proceeding from the sovereignty of
God, I am at least, I submit, on firmer (and higher?) ground than if I
were to proceed, as the Supreme Court does, from the sovereign dig-
nity of, say, the State of Idaho.
One can hope that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito-prac-
ticing Catholics, both of them-will agree, for the common good of
all. 22 7
224 MARITAIN, supra note 72, at 25.
225 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY 2 (1998).
226 See id. at 2, 68; see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, Free Exercise! Following Con-
science, Developing Doctrine, and Opening Politics, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 933 (1999)
(reviewing NOONAN, supra note 225).
227 Catholic social thought of the last hundred years has been concerned to deny
or limit claims of sovereignty; the Catholic model is one of plural social authorities in
healthy competition with one another under a state limited by and guided by the
principle of subsidiarity (as understood in the papal encyclicals), (e.g., family,
[VOL. 82-.1
2006) AGAINST SOVEREIGNTY 
225
churches, schools, etc.). See Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity 
in Catho-
lic Social Doctrine, 7 PROVIDENCE 52, 54 (2002).
226 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW (VOL. 82:1
